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Abstract. This paper assesses whether the legal independence granted to the Central 
Bank of Egypt (CBE) under the latest legislation is factual. I followed Fry’s methodology, 
which assumes that the level of independence of the central bank is determined by fiscal 
attributes. In an attempt to develop Fry’s method, I used a simple criterion to assess the 
central bank’s independence, namely, that the central bank is actually independent if it 
can fulfill its money supply target. Applying this criterion to the CBE and some other CBs 
in the developed countries and emerging market economies, we find that: (i) the legal 
independence granted to the CBE under the latest legislation is not factual; although the 
final objective of monetary policy is to achieve price stability, the CBE failed to fulfill its 
money supply target and achieve price stability, because it was responsive to political 
pressure and did not react to fulfill its money supply target; (ii) such political pressure on 
the CBE is due to fiscal attributes, as measured by domestic credit to the government; 
(iii) CBs whose independence is factual, according to our criterion, showed a negative 
relationship between the legal indices, as measured by the GMT index, and the fiscal 
attributes measured by DCGY. However, the relationship was anomalous when measured 
by the rate of inflation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With the problem of higher inflation facing the industrialized economies during the 
1970s and early 1980s, one important argument pointed to an inherent inflation bias in 
discretionary monetary policy. Under rational expectations an expansionary monetary policy 
will not affect real output, but average inflation will be higher. This explanation raises the 
question ‘Why might central banks prefer economic expansions or have output goals that 
exceed the natural rate of output?’ Economists frequently point to political pressures on the 
Central Bank (CB). Numerous studies have tried to measure politicians’ influence on 
monetary policymakers. The fundamental assumption of these studies is that the CB is more 
concerned than the elected government with maintaining low and stable rates of inflation. 
Consequently, if the CB became less subject to political pressure it would be able to deliver 
lower rates of inflation.  
One branch of these studies has tried to measure Central Bank Independence (CBI) by 
constructing indices for CBI derived from CBs’ charters and estimating the relationship 
between such indices and the rate of inflation. The major defect of these studies is that legal 64 IBRAHIM L. AWAD 
indices may not reflect the relationship between governments and CBs that exists in reality. In 
countries with a lower degree of democracy and where the rule of law is less strongly 
embedded in the political culture, as in most developing countries, there can be a wide gap 
between the formal legal institutional arrangements and the actual practice. Thus, for 
developing countries, these CBI indices may not be accurate, because legal independence 
does not mean actual independence. 
“Actual independence is impossible to quantify” (Cukierman, 1992, p. 273). Another 
branch of these studies did not take Cukierman’s advice and tried to measure the actual 
independence of CBs using some indicators of political pressure. The central tenet of this 
approach is that political pressure on the CB will arise even if the CB is legally independent. 
A CB with any degree of independence is still part of the system of government. 
Consequently, politicians always try to influence the CB to adopt policies compatible with 
their preferences. The degree of responsiveness of the CB to such political pressure depends 
on the extent to which the CB is actually independent. Then, by constructing an indicator of 
political pressure on the CB, we can measure the degree of responsiveness of the CB to such 
political pressure and consequently judge whether CB independence is de facto (factual) or 
just de jure. The major defects of these studies are that the channels through which political 
pressure might work are not clear and the reaction of the CB to fiscal policy is ambiguous. 
Furthermore, some studies give more attention to CBI in the developing countries, 
relying on the fiscal dominance hypothesis. In the developing countries the fiscal situation 
will constrain if not dictate the CB’s activities and therefore determine the extent of CBI. Fry 
(1998) tried to measure actual CB independence by estimating the reaction of the CB to the 
government’s demands to increase credit. In fact, domestic credit to the government is a 
crossing point between the CB and the government. Consequently, the reaction of the CB to 
such demands (pressure) represents a linkage between political pressure on the CB and the 
actual independence of the CB.  
In this paper I followed Fry’s methodology for assessing the legal independence of 
CBs. I tried to develop Fry’s method using a new criterion to assess the legal independence of 
the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), namely, that the CB is actually independent if it can fulfill 
its money supply target. 
I organized this paper as follows: section 2 presents previous studies of CBI and 
political pressure on CBs. Section 3 assesses the previous studies. Section 4 focuses on Fry’s 
methodology. Section 5 focuses on our attempt to develop Fry’s method. Section 6 assesses 
the legal independence granted to the CBE under the latest legislation. Section 7 concludes. 
2. PREVIOUS STUDIES OF CB INDEPENDENCE AND POLITICAL PRESSURE ON CBS 
Greater attention has been focused on the relationship between monetary policymakers 
and politicians. In the literature there are two broad approaches to measuring this relationship. 
The first consists of studies based on legal attributes and therefore addressing the legal 
independence of CBs. The second involves studies based on non-legal attributes and therefore 
addressing political pressure on CBs. Besides these two approaches, there is another branch of 
studies which addresses the actual independence of CBs based on the fiscal dominance 
hypothesis. In this part I will briefly present each of these approaches.  
2.1 Previous studies of the legal independence of CBs
1
The theoretical basis of these studies depends on the notion that CBs in democratic 
countries are more concerned with maintaining low and stable rates of inflation than the 
elected government. If a CB becomes free of political pressure it will be able to deliver stable 
and low rates of inflation. In the theoretical models, CBI is introduced by means of the weight 
placed on inflation objectives in the loss function. The CB will be more independent if such 
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weight in the loss function exceeds that of the government. The CB in this case is described as 
a Rogoff-conservative CB. 
To measure how independent a CB is, empirical studies have constructed CBI indices 
based on the CB’s legal characteristics. To investigate the relationship between CBI and the 
inflation rate, empirical studies (Eijffinger and Keulen, 1995, p. 57) have used this equation: 
Average monthly inflation (π) = α0 + α1 (CBI) + ε1
Using legal indices for CBI, many studies try to prove the theoretical assumption that 
higher levels of CBI, as detected by legal indices, will lead to lower rates of inflation. These 
studies have also used panel data about developing and developed countries to find such a 
negative correlation/relationship between CBI and the rate of inflation. Finding such a 
relationship is important to judge whether the legal independence of the CB is factual (de 
facto) or just formal (de jure).  
Bade and Parkin (1977) presented the first empirical study of CBI using an index 
based on legal attributes. The study comprises twelve industrial countries during the period 
1951–1975. They measured the independence of the CB according to the following criteria: 
(i) the primary objective of the CB according to the law; (ii) the degree of government 
influence over CB policy (the government’s ability to appoint the members of the board of 
directors, government representation in the board of directors, and which authority controls 
monetary policy).  
Alesina (1988, 1989) includes monetary financing rules, thus enlarging Bade and 
Parkin’s index of policy independence to include the following criterion: the obligation of the 
CB to buy short-term treasury papers, as the monetary financing obligation can seriously 
harm CBI with respect to monetary policy making. Alesina (1988) examines how the degree 
of CB autonomy affects the magnitude of political influence over the economy and monetary 
policy. An independent CB is able to reduce fluctuations in monetary policy brought about by 
the election cycle.  
Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) built a two-part legal index for CBI. The 
authors defined “political autonomy” as the ability of the CB to select the final objectives of 
monetary policy, and defined “economic autonomy” as the ability of the CB to select 
monetary policy instruments. They constructed an index from eight criteria for each part, and 
assigned one point for each criterion if it is satisfied
2. The overall index, the total sum of the 
points of the two-part index, is a measurement of CBI. 
Cukierman (1992) constructs three indices of CBI. The first index (LVAU-LVAW) 
contains 16 indicators grouped under four main headings; a
 heading about the chief executive 
officer (CEO), a heading about policy formulation (PF), a heading about the objectives of the 
central bank (OBJ), and a heading about the limitations on the CB for lending to the 
government (LL). The second index, the turnover rate of the CB’s governor (TOR), is based 
on the assumption that the higher is the TOR the lower is the CB’s autonomy. The third index 
(QVAU-QVAW) is constructed on the basis of responses given to a questionnaire exploring 
various aspects of the CB’s autonomy by focusing not only on the legal aspects, but also on 
the instruments used by the CB.  
Alesina and Summers (1993) constructed another CBI index using the average of Bade 
and Parkin, expanded by Alesina (1988, 1989) and GMT (1991).  
Describing policy independence, like GMT, as the capacity of the CB to choose the 
final objectives of monetary policy, Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) constructed another legal 
index for CBI. It comprised the formal responsibility of the CB with regard to monetary 
policy, the relationship between the CB and the government/parliament in the formulation of 
monetary policy, and the procedures for the appointment of the board of directors. 
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  Arnone et al. (2006b) presented an update of the GMT index based on the CB 
legislation as of the end of 2003. The index comprised a set of developing countries, emerging 
market economics, and OECD countries. The authors presented a reconstruction of the GMT 
index based on Cukierman (1992) for a smaller set of countries, and evaluated the changes in 
CB autonomy between 1992 and 2003. Their results point to a significant increase in CB 
autonomy particularly for developing countries. Improvements in CB autonomy had, in most 
cases, involved a three-stage process: an initial stage in which the political foundations for CB 
autonomy were laid, a stage in which operational autonomy developed, and further political 
autonomy in terms of policy formulation and the appointment of senior management. 
Since the legal indices of CBI may not reflect the real relationship that exists in 
practice between the government and the CB, another methodology (see Mahadeva and 
Sterne, 2000) tried to avoid this limitation by asking central bankers directly, using two 
methods. The first method interprets responses to the general subjective question, ‘How 
would you define CBI?’ then uses the answers to construct an index of self-assessment of 
CBI. The second method involves asking central bankers, ‘How independent are your own 
institutions?’ The answer to this question depends on the answers to a number of objective 
indicators. Using probit regression, the study attempts to explain which objective indicators of 
CBI explain the subjective self-assessment. One of the important results of this study is that 
self-assessment of CBI is strongly associated with both the degree of instrument 
independence measured and the absence of a deficit finance obligation. Also, the results for 
developing countries are similar to those of the entire sample. The absence of a deficit finance 
obligation and instrument independence explain the self-assessment variable. Considering the 
study group together with developing and transitional economies, the results show that the 
deficit finance limits have the most important influence on the perception of CB 
independence.  
2.2 Previous studies of political pressure on CBs  
The analysis of political pressure under this approach has been established on the 
background of the political business cycle. Drazen (2002) argues that reconsidering the pre-
electoral political monetary cycle as an explanation for political pressure on the CB is 
important for the following reasons: (i) there may be indirect effects of the electoral cycle on 
monetary policy; (ii) in countries with independent central banks, pre-electoral monetary 
cycles are noticeable, with money growth rates rising before elections and the inflation rate 
rising after elections; (iii) using policy tools other than monetary policy to influence election 
outcomes may have a significant effect on monetary policy. The nature of this effect depends 
on the interaction between the CB and politicians.  
Drazen presented a theoretical model for political pressure on the CB. Since 
accommodating monetary policy is worth more to politicians in election years than in non-
election years, the amount of pressure differs over the electoral cycle. This induces an 
electoral cycle in monetary policy even though the CB is independent and has no electoral 
motive per se. In equilibrium, the monetary authority accommodates the politicians’ desired 
policies in electoral years, but generally it is free of political influence in non-election years. 
An electoral cycle in fiscal policy may intensify the political monetary cycle, while an 
electoral structure that allows the government to call early elections may lessen it. 
Empirical studies have tried to construct an indicator for political pressure on CBs. 
From the point of view of these studies, political pressure on CBs will occur even if the CB is 
legally independent, as politicians always try to influence the CB to adopt policies compatible 
with their preferences. But the degree of responsiveness of the CB to such political pressure 
depends on the extent to which the CB is actually independent. With a higher degree of CBI, 
such influence will arise only in indirect ways (since the CB, despite its independence, is still 
part of the system of government). So, by constructing an indicator for political pressure on 
the CB we can measure the degree of responsiveness of the CB to such political pressure, and 
consequently judge whether the independence of the CB is de facto or just de jure.    Towards Measurement of Political Pressure on Central Banks in the Emerging Market Economies  67 
 Havrilesky (1993) constructed an index for political pressure on CBs. This index was 
based on the number of newspaper reports in which politicians revealed their preferences 
about a more or less restrictive monetary policy. Any article calling for a monetary easing was 
assigned the value +1, while any article calling for monetary tightness was assigned the value 
–1. The final index, as an indicator of the net political pressure, is the net summation of the 
negatives and positives. Havrilesky applied his study to the Federal Reserve by counting the 
number of reports in the Wall Street Journal of politicians arguing in favor of more or less 
restrictive monetary policy. He found that the Federal Reserve’s polices responded to this 
index. 
Maier et al. (2002) applied Havrilesky’s approach to the Deutsche Bundesbank after 
extending the analysis to include the pressure arising from other interest groups and analyzing 
press reports in different newspapers. He concluded that the Bundesbank did not respond to 
political pressure and its policies were in line with the wishes of the banking sector. 
Using the extended version of Havrilesky’s approach (1993) by Maier (2002), Gersl 
(2006) tried to measure and explain the political pressure on the Czech National Bank (CNB). 
He concluded that the CNB faced considerable political pressure toward a monetary easing in 
the period 1997–2005, comparable with the pressure on the Federal Reserve and slightly 
higher than the pressure on the Deutsche Bundesbank. However, the CNB did not succumb to 
such pressure. Therefore, political pressure did not have any systematic impact on the 
direction of monetary policy. Hence the legal independence of the CNB was proved to be 
factual as well. 
2.3 Previous studies of the actual independence of CBs based on the fiscal dominance 
hypothesis 
This approach gives more attention to CBs in developing countries, relying on the 
fiscal dominance hypothesis. In developing countries the fiscal situation will constrain, if not 
dictate, the CB’s activities and therefore determine the extent of the CB’s independence. To 
assess how independent a CB is, Fry (1998) used a simple measure based on an action that all 
CBs can take: reaction to increased credit demands by the government. Using the change in 
domestic credit as a proxy for monetary policy, he constructed a monetary policy reaction 
function. His hypothesis states that the extent of neutralization depends on both the size of the 
government deficit and the methods by which it is financed. Since governments can finance 
their deficit in four ways (borrowing at zero cost from the CB, borrowing from domestic 
commercial banks at below-market interest rates, borrowing abroad in foreign currency, and 
borrowing at market interest rates from the voluntary domestic private sector), the CB will be 
less independent if the government deficit is higher and the government uses the first two 
methods to finance its deficit.  
Fry measured the degree of CB independence by the value of the neutralization 
coefficient, that is, the reaction of the CB to the government’s demand for more credit to 
finance the budget deficit. Since domestic credit plus net foreign assets constitute the assets 
backing the monetary stock, an increase in net foreign assets must be offset by a decrease in 
domestic credit to prevent any change in the money stock or to make the CB able to fulfill its 
money supply target. To examine whether CBs in developing countries are independent, Fry 
estimated the neutralization coefficient for a variety of developing countries. His result was 
that a larger deficit and greater government reliance on the domestic banking system are 
associated with less neutralization, and consequently less CBI.  
As determined in open-economy macroeconomics, a CB-engineered increase in the 
real interest rate makes domestic government debt more attractive and leads to a real 
appreciation. However, if the increase in the real interest rate also increases the probability of 
default on the debt, the effect may be instead to make domestic government debt less 
attractive, and leads to a real depreciation. That outcome is more likely the higher the initial 
level of debt, the higher the proportion of foreign-currency-denominated debt, and the higher 
the price of risk. In such case, fiscal policy, not monetary policy, is the right instrument to 68 IBRAHIM L. AWAD 
decrease inflation. Blanchard (2004) argues that this is the situation found in the Brazilian 
economy in 2002 and 2003. 
3. ASSESSMENT OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
The general conclusion found in the literature pertaining to the empirical studies of 
legal CBI can be summarized as follows (Ferreira de Mendonca, 2005, and Arnone et al., 
2006): (i) among industrial economies there is a strong negative correlation between de jure 
CBI and inflation; (ii) in developing countries there is no evident relationship between legal 
CBI and inflation; (iii) there is a positive correlation between the political vulnerability of the 
CB and the variation of inflation; (iv) countries in which the monetary authorities announced 
their goals for inflation presented lower rates of inflation; (v) legal CBI is not correlated with 
the average real growth rate; (vi) CBs with a higher degree of independence do not finance 
deficits. 
One of the main defects of the legal indices for CBI is that the concept of 
independence differs across such indices, even though they deal with the same thing. In other 
words, there is no homogeneous concept of CBI across the legal indices. Ferreira de 
Mendonca (2005) examines this point using a correlation analysis for the three indices 
frequently used in empirical studies of CBI (Alesina and Summers, Cukierman, and GMT). 
Focusing on 15 industrialized countries and performing the analysis for independence indices 
and independence rankings, the finding was that there is no relationship between these 
measures of independence after the most independent countries (Germany, Switzerland, and 
United States) are omitted from the analysis. 
Another defect of the legal indices is that they may not reflect the relationship between 
the government and the CB that exists in practice. In countries with a lower degree of 
democracy and where the rule of law is less strongly embedded in the political culture (as in 
most developing countries), there can be a wide gap between the formal legal institutional 
arrangements and the actual practice. Thus, for developing countries these CBI indices may 
not be accurate.  
Economists have pointed out other defects in the empirical studies based on the legal 
indices of CBI (Walsh, 1998, pp. 379–381, and Arnone et al., 2006). (i) Average inflation and 
the degree of CBI might be jointly determined by the strength of the political constituencies 
opposed to inflation. In the absence of these constituencies, increasing CBI will not affect 
inflation. This means that even if the CB is independent, higher political pressure with no 
equivalent opposite directions may result in inflation. (ii) Another problem with the 
estimations of the equation given above is that it fails to correct for country-specific factors 
that may affect inflation and may also be correlated with the indices of CBI. Correcting for 
potential bias requires the inclusion of other determinants of inflation in the above equation. 
(iii) Most economists cast doubt on the relationship between CBI and average inflation. A 
complete understanding of this relationship requires a better understanding of the factors that 
have led to the variations in CBI across countries. The best way to understand such 
differences is to estimate the above equation directly for one-country rather than cross-section 
comparisons. However, this task is not easy. (iv) While CBI raises the issue of subjecting the 
CB to democratic control, the linkage between CBI and CB accountability is not clear in most 
of these studies. 
Moreover, the political pressure approach is also criticized. Besides the other flaws of 
Havrilesky’s approach (see Gersl, 2006, p. 4) the major defects are as follows. (i) The 
channels through which political pressure might work are not clear. (ii) The reaction of the 
CB to fiscal policy is ambiguous. (iii) Without complete coordination between fiscal policy 
and monetary policy, the CB may be coerced to conduct monetary policy in favor of 
politicians’ interests. Such coordination between monetary and fiscal policy reflects the 
government’s desire, side by side with the CB, to curb inflation. This point is also not clear in 
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Some important lessons from the previous studies are as follows. (i) Political pressure 
on CBs will occur with any degree of CBI. This is simply because CBs with the highest 
degree of independence are still within the system of government. (ii) The degree of inflation 
resulting from political pressure on CBs depends on whether CBI is factual or only formal. 
(iii) Since the degree of resulting inflation is the product of the interaction between the 
political pressure on the CB for a monetary easing and a higher or lower degree of 
responsiveness of the CB, then we can assess the degree of CBI by the ability of the CB to 
fulfill its money supply target in the face of political pressure. (iv) One of the crossing points 
between fiscal policy and monetary policy, and consequently between the government and the 
CB, is “domestic credit to the government.” On the one hand, this is one of the sources of 
political pressure on the CB. On the other hand, it constitutes an essential part of the assets 
backing the money supply, and so it is important for monetary policy to keep it under control. 
The fiscal dominance hypothesis, discussed by Fry, represents a step in that direction. 
The reaction of the CB to the government’s demands to increase credit represents a linkage 
between political pressure on the CB and CBI. Such a reaction measures to what extent the 
CB is actually independent, especially in developing countries. Since CBs in the developed 
countries may or may not be asked to provide credit to central government, this measure (the 
reaction of the CB to the government’s demand for higher credit) can be developed into a 
comprehensive indicator of the actual independence of CBs. In the following two sections I 
will present Fry’s methodology in more detail and then develop it to serve my purposes. 
4. FRY’S METHODOLOGY  
Fry began with this equation: 
(1)  DDCY = f(DNFAY, Xi)
where DDCY represents the change in domestic credit scaled by GDP, DNFAY represents the 
change in net foreign assets scaled by GDP, and Xi represents the other explanatory variables 
other than DNFAY (the gap between domestic inflation and inflation in the industrialized 
economies, the gap between actual and potential output, economic growth…). Complete 
sterilization of net foreign assets on the supply of money implies a coefficient of DNFAY 
equal to –1. Since domestic credit equals domestic credit to the government (DCG) plus 
domestic credit to the private sector (DCP), the above equation might be written as follows: 
(2)  DDCPY = f( DNFAY, Xi ) – DDCGY 
where DDCPY is the change in domestic credit to the private sector scaled by GDP, and 
DDCGY is the change in domestic credit to the government scaled by GDP. The last equation 
represents the monetary policy reaction function that Fry used to estimate the neutralization 
coefficient. Complete neutralization of the government’s extra borrowing requirements 
implies a coefficient of –1 for DDCGY. Partial neutralization will produce a coefficient less 
than zero and higher than –1, and no neutralization entails a coefficient of zero. Complete 
neutralization represents the highest level of CBI, while zero neutralization represents, in fact, 
complete subordination of the CB to the government. Fry argues that, 
 ‘a central bank that says to the government “we cannot resist your financing demands, 
but we shall neutralize them by squeezing the private sector and we shall tell the private 
sector exactly why we have to squeeze credit” is surely acting more independently than 
one that simply lets domestic credit rise by the full extent of any extra government 
borrowing from the banking system.’ 
Fry used a system of simultaneous equations. He treated the variable change in 
domestic credit to the government (DDCGY) as exogenous, and the variables the inflation 
gap (INFGAP) and the change in net foreign assets (DNFAY) as endogenous. He used 3SLS. 
The instruments are: lagged DNFAY, lagged INFGAP, and lagged money and growth rates, 
the rate of change in oil prices, the OECD growth rate, and the world interest rate. The 
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(3)  DDCPY = b1DNFAY + b2DNFAYt-1 + b3DDCGY + b4DDCGYt-1 + b5INFGAP + 
b6L.DNFAY + b7L.DNFAYt-1 + b8L.DDCGY + b9L.DDCGYt-1 + b10L.INFGAP   
where L is a dummy variable taking a value of zero for countries in the high group and 
one for countries in the low group. 
Fry’s method does have some defects. (i) Although the variable DDCGY is treated as 
exogenous the instruments used for the endogenous variables may affect it. For example, an 
increase in the inflation rate may increase DDCG. But Fry argues that the effect of the 
inflation rate on DDCG may be offset by an opposite effect on the economic growth rate, as 
economic growth tends to reduce the government’s borrowing requirements. (ii) Even if we 
assumed that the opposite effects of these two variables are equal, the increase in the budget 
deficit may shift the whole equation if the CB sought to finance it by issuing new money. If 
this happened (as is the case in the majority of developing countries) overall domestic credit 
would increase. In such case we may find a positive relationship between DDCPY and 
DDCGY. Fry’s equation does not consider the case that the coefficient of DDCPY/DDCGY 
might be positive. (iii) The CB will be actually independent if it can fulfill its money supply 
target by offsetting changes in NFA and changes in DCG with changes in DCP. Since 
increasing the interest rate penalizes the government, the CB may be coerced to keep the 
interest rate unchanged despite an increase in DCG or an increase in the inflation rate. Again, 
Fry’s equation did not consider this probability.  
5. DEVELOPING FRY’S METHODOLOGY  
In spite of these limitations in Fry’s methodology, the idea is valuable. We may 
develop it to derive a comprehensive indicator of actual CB independence. The government’s 
credit requirement is a channel for political pressure on the CB. An increasing public debt and 
budget deficit lead to increasing government demand for credit. Consequently, the political 
pressure on the CB will also increase. Without a budget deficit, the government’s credit 
requirements would vanish and the political pressure on the CB might vanish too. Where the 
public debt and budget deficit exist with a higher ratio (as in most developing countries) the 
CB will be actually independent if it can neutralize them. “Neutralizing” means that the CB 
will not miss its money supply target. To fulfill its money supply target, the CB will also 
sterilize changes in NFA. Since the CB cannot affect DCG, the CB will change DCP to offset 
changes in NFA and fulfill its money supply target. 
The criterion for an actually independent CB is the ability of the CB to fulfill its 
money supply target. This means that we should not evaluate the success of the CB only by 
the value of the neutralization coefficient. Given this money supply target:  
(4)  M
* ≡ NFA + DCP + DCG 
The CB can fulfill its target (M)* if it can satisfy the right-hand side of (4). To satisfy 
it, the CB should offset any change in NFA and DCG by changing DCP. Consequently, the 
coefficient sign of the estimation DCP/NFA, DCG may serve as indicator that the CB can or 
cannot fulfill its money supply target. We can assess the legal independence of CBs simply by 
estimating (5): 
(5)    DCPY =a1 + a2 NFAY + a3 DCGY 
Thus, we have two possibilities: (i) if coefficients a2 and a3 are negative, then the CB 
behaves in such a way that it fulfills its target, and so the CB is actually independent, or the 
legal (formal) independence granted to the CB is factual; (ii) if at least one of these two 
coefficients is positive, then the CB cannot fulfill its target and so the legal (formal) 
independence granted to the CB is not factual. 
In the following section I will use this simple indicator to assess the legal 
independence granted to the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE). And I will check the results by 
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6. ASSESSING THE LEGAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF EGYPT 
(CBE) 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Egypt – acting in agreement with the IMF and WB – 
implemented an “Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program” (ERSAP). The 
purpose was to reform the country’s macroeconomic policies and increase the role of the 
private sector in the economy. Under the ERSAP, Egypt liberalized its interest rate in 1991 
and applied an active privatization program starting from this date. During this period the 
CBE was targeting the exchange rate. In January 2003, Egypt floated its exchange rate. The 
CBE changed its policy from exchange rate targeting to monetary growth targeting as an 
intermediate objective for monetary policy. New legislation was promulgated. Law No. 88 of 
2003, as amended by Law No. 162 of 2004 and Law No. 93 of 2005, is a comprehensive law 
governing the CB, the banking sector, and money
3. Under the current new legislation, the 
final objective of monetary policy is to achieve price stability.  
In this part, before assessing the legal independence granted to the CBE by the new 
legislation, I will first present the legal position of the CBE under this new legislation. 
6.1 The legal position of the CBE under the current legislation 
6.1.1 Management of the CBE 
The governor of the CBE is appointed by decree of the president of Egypt, upon 
his/her nomination by the prime minister, for a renewable term of four years, and is treated 
the same as a minister in terms of his/her pension. The resignation of the governor is accepted 
by decree of the president. The governor has two deputies appointed by decree of the 
president, upon their nomination by the governor, for a renewable term of four years. The 
CBE has a board of directors (BoD) under the chairmanship of the governor, with fourteen 
members (two deputy governors, the chairman of the Capital Market Authority, three 
members representing the ministries of finance, planning and foreign trade, and eight experts 
in monetary, financial, banking, legal, and economic affairs, designated by the president for a 
renewable term of four years. The BoD is the authority responsible for realizing the objectives 
of the CBE by formulating and implementing monetary, credit, and banking policies. The 
BoD also determines the instruments required to achieve the objectives; particularly, the 
instruments of monetary policy to be followed, the structure of credit and discount rates, the 
regulatory and supervisory standards to guarantee the soundness of the financial position of 
banks, and the regulation of auctions and tenders. 
6.1.2 The objectives and functions of the CBE 
The primary objective of the CBE is to achieve price stability and banking system 
soundness within the context of the general economic policy of the state. The CBE sets, in 
agreement with the government, the objectives of monetary policy through a coordinating 
council formed by decree of the president. To achieve its objectives, the CBE has the 
following traditional powers: issuing banknotes, managing liquidity, conducting open market 
operations, influencing banking credit by using monetary policy tools, supervising the units of 
the banking sector, managing the gold and foreign exchange reserves of the state, regulating 
and managing the foreign exchange markets, supervising the national payment system, and 
monitoring the external debt of the state. In case of financial crises, the CBE stands as the last 
resort of the banking sector. Also, the CBE guarantees the finance and credit facilities 
obtained by public legal persons from banks, financial institutions, and foreign or 
international institutions.  
                                                      
4 Article 1 of this Law repeals the following former laws: (i) the banks and credit law promulgated by Law No. 
163 of 1957, (ii) Law No. 120 of 1975 concerning the central bank of Egypt and the banking sector, (iii) Law 
No. 205 of 1990 concerning the secrecy of bank accounts, (iv) Law No. 38 of 1994 regulating dealing in foreign 
exchange, and (v) Law No. 155 of 1998 regulating the private sector’s contribution to the capital of public sector 
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6.1.3 The relationship between the government and the CBE 
The CBE acts as a financial advisor and agent for the government. Consequently, the 
CBE executes banking transactions pertaining to the government and public legal persons, as 
well as internal and external finance, with banks according to the conditions set by the BoD. 
The CBE, acting as the bank of the government, charges fees on the services it renders to the 
government and public legal persons according to its own list of fees on banking services, and 
the government may designate the CBE to act on its behalf in issuing government bonds and 
bills of all types of maturities. The CBE extends financing to the government, upon its 
request, to cover the seasonal deficit on the general budget, provided that the amount of such 
finance does not exceed 10% of the average revenues of the general budget in the three 
previous years. The term of such finance is three months renewable for other similar periods, 
with a maximum of twelve months. The conditions concerning this finance are determined 
upon agreement between the ministry of finance and the ECB
4.  
6.2 Assessing the legal independence of the CBE 
Using IMF data (see Appendix 1), I estimated equation 5 for the CBE over the period 
1996–2006. To verify my results for the CBE I also estimated equation 5 for some other 
countries which have different degrees of CBI as determined in the literature. These countries 
are Brazil, the Czech Republic, the USA, the UK, Germany, Poland, New Zealand, Israel, 
Japan, and Nigeria. I estimated equation 5 separately for each country so that the equation 
takes different formulas for each country. This is because the required steps for stationarity of 
the time series are different and constancy of the variances (as OLS assumes) does not exist in 
most cases (see Appendix 3).  
Table 1 includes the estimation results for all the countries in the sample. For Egypt, a 
significant positive relationship is found between the second difference of DCPY
** and the 
second difference of DCGY
**. A similar positive relationship is found in Brazil, Nigeria, and 
Japan. For Poland and Israel a positive relationship is found between DCPY and NFAY. In all 
the aforementioned countries, the CBs are not actually independent according to our criteria. 
That is, the CBs are not actually independent if there is a positive relationship between DCPY 
and either DCGY or NFAY or both of them. For the rest of the countries in the sample, a 
significant negative relationship is found between DCPY and DCGY. These countries are the 
UK, the USA, Germany, and New Zealand. For the Czech Republic, a negative and 
significant relationship is found between the difference of the logarithmic value of DCPY
** 
and the difference of NFAY
**. In the latter group of countries the CBs are actually 
independent according to our criteria.  
Focusing on the Egyptian case, the positive relationship between DCPY and DCGY 
leads us to extract the following results. (i) While the CBE sterilizes the changes in NFA by 
changing DCP in the opposite direction, it does not offset the changes in DCG to fulfill its 
money supply target. One explanation for such parallel movement of DCP and DCG is that 
the CBE cannot freely move the rate of interest despite increasing DCG, as the CBE is 
obliged to finance the general budget and the conditions of such financing are determined 
upon agreement between the ministry of finance and the CBE. ‘Agreement’ means that the 
rate of interest imposed on the government’s credit will in the best of cases be lower than the 
market interest rate. Thus, the higher the government’s demand for credit, the higher the 
overall domestic credit at the prevailing market interest rate. Consequently, the CBE misses 
its money supply target, and so the legal (formal) independence granted to the CBE is not 
factual. (ii) This result also means that there is influential political pressure on the CBE, and 
such political pressure may be due to fiscal dominance
5. 
                                                      
3 Articles 26–27. 
5A similar analysis may also apply in the other similar cases of dependent CBs. For example, in the second half 
of 1999, the Central Bank of Brazil (CBB) applied an inflation targeting approach. Despite its commitment to 
inflation targeting, and an increase in the rate of inflation from mid-2002 on, the CBB did not increase the real 
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Table 1 
Estimation results of the equation: DCPY/NFAY, DCGY 
State / 
Method  Enter all variables  Stepwise 
Egypt 
(1-L)
2 DCPY** = -0.0035 - 2.259 (1-L)
2 NFAY** + 
0.587(1-L)
2 DCGY** 
t -0.052  -1.043  1.469 
R
2 76.3 % 
d 2.031   
(1-L)
2 DCPY** = -0.001+ 0.935(1-L)
2 
DCGY** 
t -0.148  4.242
*
R
2 72 % 
d 1.99   
Brazil 
(1-L)LN DCPY = -0.139 +0.509(1-L) LN NFAY + 
0.878(1-L) LN DCGY 
t -1.671  2.765
*     11.885
*
R
2 96.6 % 
d 2.405   
(1-L)LN DCPY = -0.157 + 0.918(1-L) LN 
DCGY 
t  -1.355     9.077
*           
R
2 92.2 % 
d 2.405   
Nigeria 
DCPY** = 0.319 – 0.241 (1-L) NFAY** + 0.399 
DCGY** 
t 16.33
* -1.004 2.566
*
R
2 61.4 % 
d 1.734     
DCPY** = 0.31 + 0.44 DCGY** 
t 18.055
* 2.923
*
R
2 55 % 
d 1.84   
Poland 
 
(1-L) DCPY = -0.262 +1.604 NFAY- 0.197(1-L) 
DCGY 
t -4.406
* 4.563
* -2.053 
R
2 85.6 % 
d 1.457   
(1-L) DCPY = -0.301 +1.852 NFAY 
t -4.431
* 4.644
*
R
2 75.5 % 
d 1.945   
Japan 
DCPY = 0.603 +3.989 NFAY+ 4.234(1-L) DCGY 
t 0.952  0.575  2.989
*
R
2 75.9 % 
d 1.921   
DCPY = 0.966 + 3.574(1-L) DCGY 
t 13.952
* 4.533
*
R
2 74.6 % 
d 1.607   
Czech 
Repub
lic 
(1-L) LN DCPY
** = -0.0341 + 0.309 (1-L) NFAY
** 
- 0.607(1-L) DCGY
**
t -0.575  3.246
* -1.735 
R
2 66.1 % 
d 2.147     
(1-L) LN DCPY
** = -0.0655 + 0.274 (1-L) 
NFAY
**  
t -1.022  2.594
*
R
2 49 % 
d 1.106     
New 
Zealan
d 
DCPY
* = -7.849 – 0.275 NFAY
*+ 1.087 DCGY
*
t -0.781  -0.582  9.737
*
R
2 100 % 
d 1.047     
DCPY
* = -6.753 + 1.152 DCGY
*
t -0.714  176.982
*
R
2 100 % 
d 0.932     
USA 
 
(1-L) DCPY = 0.0229 + 0.78 (1-L) NFAY – 0.912 
(1-L) DCGY 
t 10.49
* 3.597
* -43.202
*
R
2 99.9 % 
d 2.472   
(1-L) DCPY = 0.019 – 0.891 (1-L) DCGY 
t 5.787
* -25.393
*
R
2 99.1 % 
d 2.472   
UK 
 
(1-L) DCPY = 0.133 –0.273 NFAY– 2.292 DCGY 
t 4.037
* -0.882 -2.85
*
R
2 60.9 % 
d 1.649   
(1-L) DCPY = 0.133 – 2.345 DCGY 
t 4.808
* -2.972
*
R
2 55.8 % 
d 1.727   
Germany 
 
(1-L)
2 DCPY = 0.287 –0.288(1-L)
2 NFAY– 1.116 
DCGY 
t 2.809
* -2.063 -2.846
*
R
2 81.9 % 
d 1.831   
(1-L)
2 DCPY = 0.352 – 1.379 DCGY 
t 2.814
* -2.892
*
R
2 62.6 % 
d 2.536   
Israel 
DCPY/√DCGY = 0.892 +3.344(NFAY/√DCGY) 
+1.11(1-L)(√DCGY) 
t 4.953
* 14.312
* 0.246 
R
2 98.6 % 
d 0.879   
DCPY/√DCGY = 0.874 
+3.302(NFAY/√DCGY)  
t 5.716
* 22.363
*
R
2 98.6 % 
d 0.816   
                                                                                                                                                            
policy and not monetary policy. Also, Maier (2002) and Gersl (2006) reach the same conclusion for the 
Bundesbank, the Federal Reserve Bank, and the Czech National Bank, that is, there was influential political 
pressure on these CBs, but they behaved independently, as mentioned in section 2.2. 74 IBRAHIM L. AWAD 
* Significant at the 0.05 level.    L: A lag operator for one period. 
For more details about the estimation process see Appendix 3. 
One method for investigating whether fiscal dominance is the main reason for the 
political pressure on the CBE is to examine the relationship between the legal indices of CBI 
and domestic credit to the government
6. Appendix 2 includes the distribution of the GMT 
indices calculated by Arnone et al. (2006b) for the periods 1991–1992 and 2004. Previous 
studies, using panel data, examined the relationship between the average rate of inflation and 
the legal indices. As mentioned, this method is criticized in most of the literature because the 
direction of the causality between the CBI indices and the average rate of inflation is not 
determined. That is, does CBI lead to lower rates of inflation? Or is it a higher rate of inflation 
that leads governments, especially in the emerging market economies, to tie their hands and 
give CBs more legal independence? As mentioned in most of the literature, no general rule 
applies and studies that directly address individual country cases are recommended. 
Following the tradition, I estimated inflation (π) on the CBI indices. As an alternative 
method, I estimated DCGY on the CBI indices. For the USA and the Czech Republic, I could 
not examine the relationship between the legal indices and the average rate of inflation and 
domestic credit to the government because of the constancy of the value of the GMT index in 
the case of the USA and the unique value of the GMT index in the case of the Czech 
Republic. For the same reason, I could not examine the relationship between political 
independence and inflation and DCGY in the case of Japan and Israel (see Appendix 2). For 
the other countries, I estimated the relationship between the GMT index and the inflation rate 
(the annual percentage change in the CPI) and DCGY during the period 1996–2005. 
Table 2 shows the following estimation results. (i) The relationship between the rate of 
inflation (π) and CBI as measured by the GMT index was anomalous for the developed 
countries group in the sample (the UK, Germany, and New Zealand). The higher the level of 
CBI (as detected by the GMT index), the higher the rate of inflation. The relationship between 
DCGY and CBI as measured by the GMT index was accurate for the same group of 
developed countries. The higher the level of CBI, the lower the level of DCGY. The negative 
correlation between CBI and DCGY verifies our result about the independence of CBs in the 
developed economies. As shown in Table 1, the CBs in this group of countries are actually 
independent. (ii) For the rest of the countries in the sample – Egypt, Brazil, Poland, Israel, 
Japan, and Nigeria – the relationship between the rate of inflation and CBI was accurate 
(except in the case of Nigeria). The higher the level of CBI, the lower the level of π. For the 
same group of countries, the relationship between DCGY and CBI was also accurate (except 
in the cases of Japan and Brazil). The higher the level of CBI, the lower the level of DCGY. 
For Japan and Brazil, a higher level of CBI was correlated with a higher DCGY. In all the 
countries of the last group, the CBs are not actually independent according to our calculations 
in Table 1. (iii) Despite the negative correlation between CBI and DCGY in some countries 
(Poland, Israel, and Nigeria), the CBs in these countries are not actually independent 
according to the results shown in Table 1. As an explanation for such contradiction, Table 1 
focuses on the significant (positive or negative) relationship, while Table 2 focuses only on 
the sign (positive or negative) of the relation. Consequently, DCGY might be decreasing, as a 
result of a gradually increasing level of CBI, but still has a significant effect on the CB’s 
decisions in this group of countries. 
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Table 2 
Estimation results using GMT indices 
Indicator/ 
Equation 
 
π / CBI Indices  DCGY / CBI 
Indices 
Indicator/ 
Equation 
 
π / CBI 
Indices 
DCGY / 
CBI 
Indices 
Egypt New  Zealand 
Political index  -14.88  -0.16  Political 
index
3.782 -0.0076 
Economic 
index 
24.7 0.275  Economic 
index
3.782 -0.0076 
General index  -55  -0.6  General 
index
3.782 -0.0076 
Brazil Israel 
Political index  -4.2  1.62  Political 
index
- - 
Economic 
index 
-0.7 0.27  Economic 
index
-5.95 -0.205 
General index  -1.28  0.5  General 
index
-13.128 -0.45 
UK Japan 
Political index  1.64  0.02  Political 
index
- - 
Economic 
index 
1.09 -0.01  Economic 
index
-0.518 2.336 
General index  1.3  -0.02  General 
index
-1.027 4.636 
Germany   Poland  
Political index  1.9  -0.08  Political 
index
-4.633 -0.061 
Economic 
index 
- 3.9  0.15  Economic 
index
-5.791 -0.067 
General index  7.88  -0.31  General 
index  -5.097 -0.076 
Nigeria 
Political index  32        -0.48 
Economic 
index  26.5       -0.4 
General index  29.32        -0.44 
Focusing on Egypt, the relationship between DCGY and the GMT index is compatible 
with the same relation between the inflation rate and the GMT index. A decrease in the level 
of CBI was accompanied by an increase in both DCGY and π. Adding this result to the 
previous result extracted from Table 1, we conclude that the current level of independence 
granted to the CBE is not factual.  
7. CONCLUSION 
To assess whether the legal independence granted to the Central Bank of Egypt, (CBE) 
under the latest legislation is factual, I followed Fry’s methodology, which assumes that the 
level of independence of the central bank is determined by fiscal attributes. In an attempt to 
develop Fry’s method, I used a simple criterion to assess the central bank’s independence, 
namely, that the central bank is actually independent if it can fulfill its money supply target. 76 IBRAHIM L. AWAD 
Applying this criterion to the CBE and some other CBs in the developed countries and 
emerging market economies, we find that: (i) the legal independence granted to the CBE 
under the latest legislation is not factual; although the final objective of monetary policy is to 
achieve price stability, the CBE failed to fulfill its money supply target and achieve price 
stability, because it was responsive to political pressure and did not react to fulfill its money 
supply target; (ii) such political pressure on the CBE is due to fiscal attributes, as measured by 
domestic credit to the government; (iii) CBs whose independence is factual, according to our 
criterion, showed a negative relationship between the legal indices, as measured by the GMT 
index, and the fiscal dominance attributes measured by DCGY. However, the relationship was 
anomalous when measured by the rate of inflation. 
However, the study assessed the actual independence of CBs by concentrating on only 
one point of conflict between monetary policy and fiscal policy, namely, the government’s 
demand for higher credit. But there are other possible points of such conflict. The rate of 
interest deserves further research as a point of conflict between CBs and governments. 
Appendix 1 
Data Used in Regression 
Years 
Indicators/  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Czech Republic (billions of korunas) 
GDP  1567.0 1679.9 1839.1 1902.3 2189.2 2352.2 2464.4 2577.1 2781.1 2970.3
NFA  265.44 325.50 421.52 607.64 676.60 808.14 924.38 821.56 863.45 1076.51
DC  1131.92 1214.25 1180.04 1136.31 1081.43 1074.78 1041.33 1252.35 1258.29 1297.86
DCP  1159.02 1272.53 1224.76 1159.58 1072.33 957.13 759.22 819.36 918.03 1102.71
DCG  -27.1 -58.28  -44.72  -23.27  9.10 117.65 282.11 432.99 340.26 195.15
π   8.448 10.682 2.105 3.931 4.706 1.785 0.108  2.827 1.846
Egypt (millions of Egyptian pounds) 
GDP  229400 257200 287400 307600 340100 358700 378900 417500 485300 538500
NFA  52717 49194 36111 25092 22860 21270 18875 34049 55415 112754
DC  190938 207724 247195 278013 302731 334522 378621 436655 508289 527845
DCP  95164 105545 133799 159958 176693 197038 207089 225023 262270 275526
DCG  95774 102179 113396 118055 126038 137484 171532 211632 246019 252319
π   4.626 3.873 3.080 2.684 2.270 2.737 4.508 11.271 4.869
USA (billions of US dollars) 
GDP  7813.2  8318.40 8781.50 9274.30 9824.60 10128.00 10469.60 10960.80 11712.50 12455.80
NFA -127.5  - 137.60 - 100.20 - 118.00 - 79.50 - 59.80 - 134.30 - 372.50 - 552.70 - 611.40
DC 6006  6493.70 7148.40 7696.20 8420.90 9164.40 9666.80 10245.80 11036.90 11970.30
DCP 5026.9  5444.50 6082.80 6622.90 7277.40 5305.80 5491.90 5892.80 6519.40 7215.90
DCG 979.1  1049.20 1065.60 1073.30 1143.50 3858.60 4174.90 4353.00 4517.50 4754.40
π   2.338 1.552 2.188 3.377 2.826 1.586 2.270 2.677 3.393
Germany (billions of German marks until 1998 – billions of euros from 1999)  
GDP  3586  3666.60 3769.90 1978.60 2062.50 2113.20 2143.20 2161.50 2207.20 2241.00
NFA 296.6  271.70 233.00 266.10 271.30 361.90 486.50 594.40 719.00 925.80
DC 4837.1  5137.00 5496.50 2917.10 2999.40 3042.30 3051.00 3043.30 3046.40 3050.90
DCP 3900.1  4137.60 4471.90 2326.40 2445.70 2497.40 2505.80 2497.40 2479.70 2504.60
DCG 937  999.40 1024.60 590.70 553.70 544.90 545.20 545.90 566.70 546.30
π   1.88 O.  936 0.57  1.471 1.975 1.373 1.048 1.667 1.954 
Brazil (millions of reais) 
GDP  778887.0 870743.0 914188.0 9738461 1101255 1200060 1346028 1556182 1766621 1937598
NFA  52860.00 44458.00 36331.00 32805.00 47041.00 38259.00 -
53403
-
9926 0
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Years 
Indicators/  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
DC  332285.0 400011.0 532086.0 526305.0 545319.0 701310.0 1119295 1275787 1427618 1653422
DCP  249996.0 287958.0 330074.0 349551.0 381941.0 410676.0 441353.0 475626.0 546520.0 651762.0
DCG  82289.00 112053.0 202012.0 176754.0 163378.0 290634.0 677942.0 800161.0 881098.0 1001660
π    6.926 3.196 4.859 7.044 6.840 8.450 14.715 6.598 6.870
UK (billions of pounds sterling) 
GDP  762.21 811.07 859.38 902.46 950.42 996.99 1048.77
-57.6 
1110.30
-56.7 
1176.53
-80.28 
1224.46
-24.67  NFA  -9.31 -17.79 27.31  3.59  4.44  -17.9 
DC  961.86 1015.92 1052.60 1131.45 1271.68 1389.66 1515.93 1652.78 1845.60 2032.08
DCP  912.27 973.37 1023.66 1100.02 1262.91 1373.15 1487.53 1630.96 1813.56 2001.80
DCG  49.59 42.55 28.94 31.43 8.77 16.51 28.40 21.82 32.04 30.28
π    3.132 3.418 1.555 2.927 1.821 1.634 2.914 2.964 2.830
Israel (millions of shekels) 
GDP  313001 352331 387211 405021 443048 498908 517975 524187 548936 582291 
NFA  29854 49949 70986 67618 70665 74639 79226 98304  118105  149080 
DC  259086  278521  315834 365240 389482 433967 459760  4363312  436365 469877 
DCP  219842 254886 303434 347382 390938 439228 480467 462949 482871 540180 
DCG  39244  23635  12401  17858  -1457  -5261  -20707 -26637 -46506 -70303 
π   9  5.4  5.2  1.14  1.1 5.63 .71 -0.41  1.32 
Poland (millions of zlotys) 
GDP  387827 472350 553560  615115 744622 779205 807859 842120 923248 980666 
NFA  61524  82808  96281  110548 131725 133899 132020 135871 143234  170808
DC  128582 160990 194228 231341 243237 272037 279045 301512 305889 319604 
DCP  57095  78565  104097 137936 197827 212598 221831 236674 245284 268982 
DCG  71487 82425 90131 93405 45410 59439 57214 64838 60605 50622 
π   15.08  11.72  7.27  10.06  5.49 1.9 0.78  3.57  2.107 
New Zealand (millions of New Zealand dollars) 
GDP  96910  99982  100627 104775 110558 120002 130983 139752 148927 156088 
NFA -10896  -18224 -24575 -30980 -33300 -36349 -30427 -32298 -42704 -54697 
DC 92084  103955 112023 122884 129423  137813 147836 162593 180242 206170 
DCP 94647  105190 112124 121884 129301 138805 147781 162631 180764 207673 
DCG -2564  -1235 -101 1001  122  -991  55  -38  -522 -1503 
π    1.187 1.266 -0.114 2.615  2.62  2.677  1.75 2.29 3.03 
Japan (trillions of yen)  
GDP*  510802  521862 515835 511837 501068 496777 489618 490544 496058 502457 
NFA 41.94  53.33 43.36 44.77 27.73 40.71 37.23 33.11 39.49 50.14 
DC 667.36  675.96 690.11 712.82  1233.19  1192.56  1161.14  1176.25 1168.12 1156.62 
DCP 575.88  578.79 583.35 570.91 972.87  564.41  521.58 498.77 486.84  499 
DCG 81.42  88.15  98.42  133.85 244.72 246.79 261.82 312.34 325.29 332.97 
π   1.76  0.66 -0.33  -0.712  -0.758  -0.85 -0.29  -0.008  -0.27 
Nigeria (millions of naira) 
GDP  2824000 29400 0
0
2837000 3320000 4981000 4864000 5603000 7191000 8553000
12440
NFA  2373 2284 2349 6625 1275 1322 1282 1388
 
2644 3894
DC  3710 3658 5124 6320 4720 8295 1328 1701
 
1262 1169
DCP  2522 3106 3661 4478 5826 8207 9327 1184
 
1496 1938
DCG  1187 5521 1463 1841
-110594 
8735 3954 5165
  -
2344
-769046 
π   8.53  10  6.61  6.93  18.87 12.87 14.03  15  17.86 
* billions of yen 
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NFA= net foreign assets, DC = domestic credit, DCP = domestic credit to the private sector, DCG = domestic 
credit to the government, π = rate of inflation (percentage annual change in CPI) 
Appendix 2 
Distribution of GMT Indices 
CBI Indices / 
Years 
1991–1992 2004  CBI Indices / 
Years
1991–1992 2004 
Czech Republic*     New Zealand   
Political index 
(score out of 7 
points) 
- 7  Political  index   
0 0.25 
Economic index 
(score out of 8 
points) 
- 7  Economic  index 
0.375 0.625 
General index  -  14  General index  0.188 0.438 
Egypt     Poland   
Political index  0.5  0.167 Political  index  0 1 
Economic index  0.6  0.8  Economic index  0.2 1 
General index  0.545  0.455  General index  0.091 1 
USA     Israel   
Political index  0.625  0.625 Political  index  0.333 0.333 
Economic index  0.875  0.875  Economic index  0.2 0.8 
General index  0.75  0.75  General index  0.273 0.545 
Germany     Japan   
Political index  0.75  1  Political index  0.125 0.125 
Economic index  0.875  0.75  Economic index  0.625 0.75 
General index  0.813  0.875  General index  0.375 0.438 
Brazil     Nigeria   
Political index  0.167  0.333 Political  index  0.167 0.333 
Economic index  0  1  Economic index  0.6 0.8 
General index  0.091  0.636  General index  0.364 0.545 
 UK 
Political index  0.125        0.375 
Economic index  0.625        1 
General index  0.375        0.688 
Source: Arnone et al. (2006b). 
* Not available for the period 1991–1992 
Appendix 3 
Stationarity Test and Estimation Results 
The unit root test is one of the most popular tools used over the past several years to 
check the stationarity of time series. Since the sample used in the study is not large I will use 
an alternative method to check stationarity, namely, the autocorrelation function (ACF).   Towards Measurement of Political Pressure on Central Banks in the Emerging Market Economies  79 
Formally, we examine the null hypothesis that the autocorrelation coefficients in the ACF are 
not significantly different from the true values of the society at a determined level of 
significant. Comparing the computed value of Box-Ljung (BL) with its critical value extracted 
from a chi-square distribution at degrees of freedom equal to the number of lags and the 
determined level of significant (0.05), one can reject or accept the null hypothesis. I will use 
the OLS method to estimate the parameters of the equation DCPY/NFAY, DCGY. I will also 
check the validity of the assumptions of OLS for all cases used in the sample. Using SPSS I 
will estimate the previous equation for eleven countries: Egypt, Brazil, Nigeria, the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Israel, New Zealand, Japan, the UK, the USA, and Germany. The ACF and 
the estimation results are as follows: 
1. Egypt 
A linear correlation is found between the residuals of the sum of the squares and 
NFAY. As a solution, I used the following transformed form: DCPY/√NFAY= A1 + A2 
(√NFAY) + A3 (DCGY/√NFAY). The resulting time series is changed to stationary after the 
second difference is taken for all the variables. Table 1 shows the stationary ACF for all the 
variables, where the value of X
2 at 7 df and a level of significance of 0.05 is equal to 14.067. 
Table 1 
ACF – The second difference 
 
Autocorrelations: DCPYWR: DCPY/ √NFAY 
Transformations: difference (2) 
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   - . 326   .  284       .    *******  |     .        1.313  .252 
 2  .080  .266      .     |**    .        1.404  .496 
 3  .011  .246      .     *     .         1.406  .704 
 4 -.240  .225       .  *****|    .         2.543  .637 
 5 -.105  .201       .   **|    .          2.819  .728 
 6 -.039  .174        .   *|   .          2.869  .825 
 7  .002  .142        .   *   .           2.869  .897 
 
Autocorrelations: DCGYWR: DCGY/ √NFAY 
Transformations: difference (2) 
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   - . 331   .  284       .    *******  |     .        1.357  .244 
 2  .013  .266      .     *     .        1.359  .507 
 3 -.263  .246      .  *****|     .         2.496  .476 
 4  .176  .225       .    |****  .         3.108  .540 
 5 -.087  .201       .   **|    .          3.296  .654 
 6 -.073  .174        .   *|   .          3.470  .748 
 7 -.021  .142        .   *   .           3.492  .836 
 
 
Autocorrelations: NFAYWR: √NFAY 
Transformations: difference (2) 
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   - . 363   .  284       .    *******  |     .        1.627  .202 
 2  .183  .266      .     |****   .        2.100  .350 
 3 -.264  .246      .  *****|     .         3.248  .355 
 4  .073  .225       .    |*    .         3.353  .501 
 5 -.072  .201       .   *|    .          3.480  .626 
 6 -.115  .174        .  **|   .          3.916  .688 
 7 -.138  .142        . ***|   .           4.864  .677 
 
The estimated parameters are: 
(1-L)
2 DCPY** = -0.0035 - 2.259 (1-L)
2 NFAY** + 0.587(1-L)
2 DCGY** 
t -0.052  -1.043  1.469 
n 9 
R
2 76.3 % 80 IBRAHIM L. AWAD 
d 2.031   
where DCPY** =  DCPY/√NFAY, NFAY** =  √NFAY, and DCGY** = 
DCGY/√NFAY.  
Using a stepwise method: 
(1-L)
2 DCPY** = -0.001 + 0.935(1-L)
2 DCGY** 
t -0.148  4.242
*
n 9 
R
2 72 % 
d 1.99   
 
2. Brazil 
The best formula making all the variables stationary is the first difference of the 
logarithmic value of all the variables. Table 2 shows this case. 
Table 2 
ACF – The logarithmic formula 
     
Autocorrelations: DIFF(LNDCPY,2) 
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   - . 520   .  284       **********.  |     .        3.352  .067 
 2  .006  .266      .     *     .        3.352  .187 
 3 -.001  .246      .     *     .         3.352  .340 
 4  .018  .225       .    *    .         3.358  .500 
 5  .015  .201       .    *    .          3.364  .644 
 6 -.017  .174        .   *   .          3.374  .761 
 7  .001  .142        .   *   .           3.374  .848 
 
Autocorrelations: DIFF(LNNFAYY,2) 
    
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   - . 261   .  284       .     *****  |     .         .842  .359 
 2 -.234  .266      .   *****|     .        1.617  .446 
 3  .115  .246      .     |**    .         1.834  .608 
 4 -.039  .225       .    *|    .         1.864  .761 
 5  .064  .201       .    |*   .          1.964  .854 
 6 -.103  .174        .  **|   .          2.314  .889 
 7 -.024  .142        .   *   .           2.343  .938 
 
 
 
Autocorrelations: DIFF(LNDCGY,2) 
    
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   - . 467   .  284       ********* .  |     .        2.697  .101 
 2  .064  .266      .     |*     .        2.754  .252 
 3 -.155  .246      .   ***|     .         3.148  .369 
 4  .016  .225       .    *    .         3.153  .533 
 5  .021  .201       .    *    .          3.164  .675 
 6  .026  .174        .   |*   .          3.186  .785 
 7 -.005  .142        .   *   .           3.187  .867 
 
The estimated parameters are: 
(1-L)LN DCPY = -0.139 +0.509(1-L) LN NFAY + 0.878(1-L) LN DCGY 
t  -1.671    2.765
*            11.885
*
n  9 
R
2 96.6 % 
d  2.405 
Using a stepwise method: 
(1-L)LN DCPY = -0.157 + 0.918(1-L) LN DCGY 
t  -1.355    9.077
*             
n  9   Towards Measurement of Political Pressure on Central Banks in the Emerging Market Economies  81 
R
2 92.2 % 
d  2.405 
3. Nigeria 
The residuals of the sum of the squares are found to be linearly correlated with NFAY. 
As a solution, I used the following formula:  
DCPY/√NFAY= A1 + A2 (√NFAY) + A3 (DCGY/√NFAY) or, 
DCPY
** = A1 + A2 NFAY
** + A3 DCGY
**
 The resulting time series was stationary, except in the case of NFAY. Table 3 shows 
the stationary time series for all the variables after the first difference is taken for NFAY
**, 
where the value of X
2 at 8 df and a level of significance of 0.05 is equal to 15.5073.  
The estimated parameters are as follows: 
DCPY
** = 0.319 – 0.241 (1-L) NFAY
** + 0.399 DCGY
**
t  16.33
* -1.004  2.566
*
n  9 
R
2 61.4 % 
d  1.734  
Table 3 
ACF – The transformed form 
 
Autocorrelations: DCPYW: DCPY/ √NFAY 
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   .  169   .  274       .        |***    .         .382  .536 
 2 -.617  .258     **.*********|     .         6.090  .048 
 3 -.326  .242      . *******|     .         7.912  .048 
 4  .142  .224       .    |***   .         8.316  .081 
 5  .362  .204       .    |*******.         11.467  .043 
 6  .041  .183        .   |*   .          11.517  .074 
 7 -.242  .158        .*****|   .          13.867  .054 
 8 -.066  .129         .  *|  .           14.126  .079 
 
 
Autocorrelations: DCGYW: DCGY/ √NFAY 
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   .  197   .  274       .        |****   .         .517  .472 
 2 -.487  .258      **********|     .         4.068  .131 
 3 -.161  .242      .   ***|     .         4.512  .211 
 4  .295  .224       .    |****** .         6.256  .181 
 5  .190  .204       .    |****  .          7.126  .211 
 6 -.164  .183        .  ***|   .          7.935  .243 
 7 -.125  .158        . ***|   .           8.564  .286 
 8 -.101  .129         . **|  .           9.182  .327 
 
Autocorrelations: NFAYW_1: (1-L)( √NFAY) 
    
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   - . 018   .  284       .        *       .          .  004   .  950
  2   - . 352   .  266       .    *******  |     .        1.756  .416 
 3 -.306  .246      .  ******|     .         3.297  .348 
 4 -.101  .225       .   **|    .         3.498  .478 
 5  .389  .201       .    |********          7.253  .203 
 6 -.063  .174        .   *|   .          7.384  .287 
 7 -.079  .142        .  **|   .           7.692  .361 
Using a stepwise method: 
DCPY
** = 0.31 + 0.44 DCGY
**
t  18.055
* 2.923
*  
n  9 
R
2 55 % 
d  1.84 
4. Czech Republic  82 IBRAHIM L. AWAD 
A nonlinear correlation is found between the residuals of the sum of the squares and 
NFAY. As a solution, I used the following formula: 
DCPY/NFAY= A1 + A21/NFAY +A3 DCGY/NFAY 
 The resulting time series was stationary, except for the variable 1/NFAY. The first 
difference and the semi-log formula were taken as follows:  
 (1-L) LN (DCPY/NFAY) = A1 + A2 (1-L)(1/NFAY ) + A3 (1-L)(DCGY/NFAY) or, 
(1-L)LN DCPY
** = A1 + A2 (1-L) NFAY
** + A3 (1-L)DCGY
** 
Table 4 shows the stationary time series for all the transformed variables, where the 
value of X
2 at 7df and a level of significance of 0.05 is equal to 14.0671. 
The estimated parameters of the above transformed form were as follow:  
(1-L) LN DCPY
** = -0.0341 + 0.309 (1-L) NFAY
** - 0.607(1-L) DCGY
**
t  -0.575  3.246
* -1.735 
n  9 
R
2 66.1 % 
d  2.147  
Using a stepwise method: 
(1-L) LN DCPY
** = -0.0655 + 0.274 (1-L) NFAY
**  
t  -1.022  2.594
*  
n  9 
R
2 49 % 
d  1.106  
 
Table 4 
ACF – The transformed form 
 
Autocorrelations: LNDCPY_1: (1-L) LN DCPY
**
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   .  293   .  284       .        |******  .        1.063  .303 
 2 -.057  .266      .     *|     .        1.109  .574 
 3  .018  .246      .     *     .         1.114  .774 
 4 -.272  .225       .  *****|    .         2.582  .630 
 5 -.353  .201       .*******|    .          5.664  .340 
 6 -.131  .174        .  ***|   .          6.234  .397 
 7 -.016  .142        .   *   .           6.247  .511 
 
Autocorrelations: NFAYW_1: (1-L) NFAY
**
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   .  259   .  284       .        |*****   .         .833  .361 
 2  .064  .266      .     |*     .         .891  .641 
 3  .040  .246      .     |*    .         .917  .821 
 4 -.263  .225       .  *****|    .         2.292  .682 
 5 -.379  .201       ********|    .          5.838  .322 
 6 -.188  .174        . ****|   .          6.999  .321 
 7 -.054  .142        .  *|   .           7.143  .414 
 
Autocorrelations: DCGYW_1: (1-L) DCGY
**
    
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   .  279   .  284       .        |******  .         .963  .327 
 2 -.275  .266      .   *****|     .        2.030  .362 
 3 -.227  .246      .  *****|     .         2.879  .411 
 4 -.162  .225       .   ***|    .         3.396  .494 
 5 -.103  .201       .   **|    .          3.657  .600 
 6 -.221  .174        . ****|   .          5.263  .511 
 7  .047  .142        .   |*  .           5.371  .615 
5. New Zealand 
The time series is found to be stationary for all the variables. A nonlinear correlation is 
found between the residuals of the sum of the squares and DCGY. As a solution I used the 
following formula: DCPY
* = A1 + A2 NFAY
* + A3 DCGY
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where DCPY
* = DCPY/ DCGY, NFAY
* = NFAY/ DCGY, and DCGY
* =1/DCGY. 
The resulting time series was also stationary, as shown in Table 5. 
The estimated parameters are as follows: 
DCPY
* = -7.849 – 0.275 NFAY
*+ 1.087 DCGY
*
t  -0.781  -0.582  9.737
*
n  10 
R
2 100 % 
d  1.047  
Using a stepwise method: 
DCPY
* = -6.753 + 1.152 DCGY
*
t  -0.714  176.982
*  
n  10 
R
2 100 % 
d  0.932  
Table 5 
ACF – The transformed form 
Autocorrelations: NFAW: NFAY/ DCGY 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   - . 381   .  274       .    ******** |     .        1.934  .164 
 2  .075  .258      .     |*    .         2.018  .365 
 3 -.172  .242      .   ***|     .         2.524  .471 
 4 -.155  .224       .   ***|    .         3.007  .557 
 5  .154  .204       .    |***  .          3.575  .612 
 6  .008  .183        .   *   .          3.577  .734 
 7 -.027  .158        .  *|   .           3.607  .824 
 8 -.001  .129         .  *  .           3.608  .891 
 
Autocorrelations: DCGW: 1/DCGY 
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   - . 403   .  274       .    ******** |     .        2.169  .141 
 2  .052  .258      .     |*    .         2.209  .331 
 3 -.132  .242      .   ***|     .         2.507  .474 
 4 -.146  .224       .   ***|    .         2.931  .569 
 5  .153  .204       .    |***  .          3.490  .625 
 6  .005  .183        .   *   .          3.491  .745 
 7 -.030  .158        .  *|   .           3.526  .832 
 8  .000  .129         .  *  .           3.526  .897 
 
Autocorrelations: DCPYW: DCPY/ DCGY 
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   - . 397   .  274       .    ******* * |     .        2.097  .148 
 2  .053  .258      .     |*    .         2.139  .343 
 3 -.137  .242      .   ***|     .         2.462  .482 
 4 -.141  .224       .   ***|    .         2.857  .582 
 5  .148  .204       .    |***  .          3.384  .641 
 6  .004  .183        .   *   .          3.384  .759 
 7 -.031  .158        .  *|   .           3.424  .843 
 8  .000  .129         .  *  .           3.424  .905 
6. Poland 
The time series was non-stationary for all the variables except for NFAY. Taking the first 
difference for the variables DCPY and DCGY, the time series is changed to stationary for all the 
variables, as shown in Table 6. 
The estimated parameters are: 
(1-L) DCPY= -0.262 +1.604 NFAY- 0.197(1-L) DCGY 
t  -4.406
* 4.563
* -2.053 
n  9 
R
2 85.6 % 
d  1.457 
Using a stepwise method: 
(1-L) DCPY = -0.301 +1.852 NFAY 84 IBRAHIM L. AWAD 
t  -4.431
* 4.644
*  
n  9 
R
2 75.5 % 
d  1.945 
 
Table 6 
ACF 
Autocorrelations: DCPY_1: (1-L)DCPY  
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   .  480   .  284       .        |**********.        2.849  .091 
 2  .116  .266      .     |**    .        3.039  .219 
 3 -.051  .246      .    *|     .         3.082  .379 
 4 -.430  .225       *********|    .         6.745  .150 
 5 -.372  .201       .*******|    .         10.173  .070 
 6 -.155  .174        .  ***|   .          10.967  .089 
 7 -.076  .142        .  **|   .          11.256  .128 
 
Autocorrelations: NFAY   
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   .  281   .  274       .        |******  .        1.050  .306 
 2  .086  .258      .     |**    .         1.161  .560 
 3 -.355  .242      . *******|     .         3.325  .344 
 4 -.404  .224       .********|    .         6.587  .159 
 5 -.316  .204       . ******|    .          8.979  .110 
 6 -.004  .183        .   *   .          8.979  .175 
 7  .027  .158        .   |*  .           9.009  .252 
 8  .266  .129         .  |*****           13.244  .104 
 
Autocorrelations: DCGY_1: (1-L)DCGY 
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   - . 275   .  284       .     *****  |     .         .935  .334 
 2 -.018  .266      .     *     .         .939  .625 
 3 -.238  .246      .  *****|     .         1.872  .599 
 4  .003  .225       .    *    .         1.872  .759 
 5  .009  .201       .    *    .          1.874  .866 
 6  .016  .174        .   *   .          1.883  .930 
 7  .003  .142        .   *   .           1.883  .966 
 
7. Japan 
The time series was stationary for all the variables except for DCGY. Taking the first 
difference for DCGY, the time series is changed to stationary, as shown in Table 7. 
The estimated parameters are: 
DCPY = 0.603 +3.989 NFAY+ 4.234(1-L) DCGY 
t  0.952  0.575  2.989
*
n  9 
R
2 75.9 % 
d  1.921 
Using a stepwise method: 
DCPY = 0.966 + 3.574(1-L) DCGY 
t  13.952
* 4.533
*  
n  9 
R
2 74.6 % 
d  1.607 
Table 7 
ACF 
Autocorrelations: DCPY   
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
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  1   .  031   .  274       .        |*     .         .013  .910 
 2 -.069  .258      .    *|     .         .085  .958 
 3 -.179  .242      .   ****|     .         .632  .889 
 4 -.215  .224       .  ****|    .         1.557  .817 
 5 -.159  .204       .  ***|    .          2.166  .826 
 6  .034  .183        .   |*   .          2.202  .900 
 7  .028  .158        .   |*  .           2.233  .946 
 8  .021  .129         .  *  .           2.260  .972 
 
Autocorrelations: NFAY   
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   - . 011   .  274       .        *       .          .  002   .  967
  2   - . 026   .  258        .      * |     .         .012  .994 
 3 -.175  .242      .   ****|     .         .537  .911 
 4 -.025  .224       .    *|    .          .550  .968 
 5 -.371  .204       .*******|    .          3.859  .570 
 6 -.111  .183        .  **|   .          4.231  .645 
 7 -.002  .158        .   *   .           4.232  .753 
 8  .217  .129         .  |****.           7.062  .530 
 
Autocorrelations: DCGY_1: (1-L)DCGY 
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   - . 106   .  284       .       ** |     .         .140  .708 
 2 -.341  .266      .  *******|     .        1.786  .409 
 3  .095  .246      .     |**    .         1.936  .586 
 4 -.012  .225       .    *    .         1.938  .747 
 5 -.234  .201       . *****|    .          3.296  .654 
 6 -.039  .174        .   *|   .          3.346  .764 
 7  .082  .142        .   |**  .           3.679  .816 
 
8. USA 
After the first difference is taken for all the variables, the time series is changed to stationary. 
Table 8 shows this case. 
The estimated parameters are: 
(1-L) DCPY = 0.0229 + 0.78 (1-L) NFAY – 0.912 (1-L)DCGY 
t  10.49
* 3.597
* -43.202
*
n  8 
R
2 99.9 % 
d  2.472 
Using a stepwise method: 
(1-L) DCPY = 0.019 – 0.891 (1-L) DCGY 
t  5.787
* -25.393
*  
n  8 
R
2 99.1 % 
d  2.472 
Table 8 
ACF 
Autocorrelations: DCPY   
Transformations: difference (1) 
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   - . 104     . 296       .      **  |      .        .124  .725 
 2 -.159  .274      .    ***|     .         .463  .793 
 3 -.286  .250      .  ******|     .         1.775  .620 
 4 -.089  .224       .   **|    .         1.935  .748 
 5  .062  .194       .    |*   .          2.037  .844 
 6  .047  .158        .   |*  .           2.125  .908 
 
Autocorrelations: NFAY   
Transformations: difference (1) 
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
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  1   .  455   .  296       .         |********* .        2.367  .124 
 2 -.076  .274      .    **|     .        2.445  .295 
 3 -.273  .250      .  *****|     .         3.634  .304 
 4 -.234  .224       .  *****|    .         4.728  .316 
 5 -.275  .194       . *****|    .          6.738  .241 
 6 -.131  .158        . ***|   .           7.426  .283 
 
Autocorrelations: DCGY   
Transformations: difference (1) 
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   - . 073   .  296       .       * |      .        .060  .806 
 2 -.211  .274      .   ****|     .         .652  .722 
 3 -.265  .250      .  *****|     .         1.778  .620 
 4 -.084  .224       .   **|    .         1.919  .751 
 5  .064  .194       .    |*   .          2.028  .845 
 6  .047  .158        .   |*  .           2.117  .909 
 
9. UK 
The time series is found to be stationary for all the variables except for DCPY. Table 8 shows 
the stationary time series for all the variables after the first difference is taken for the variable 
DCPY, where the value of X
2 at 8 df and a level of significance of 0.05 is equal to 15.5073. The 
estimated parameters are: 
(1-L) DCPY = 0.133 –0.273 NFAY– 2.292 DCGY 
t  4.037
* -0.882  -2.85
*
n  9 
R
2 60.9 % 
d  1.649 
Using a stepwise method:  
(1-L) DCPY = 0.133 – 2.345 DCGY 
t  4.808
* -2.972
*  
n  9 
R
2 55.8 % 
d  1.727 
Table 8 
ACF 
 
Autocorrelations: DCGY   
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   .  475   .  274       .        |**********.        3.010  .083 
 2  .157  .258      .     |***   .         3.382  .184 
 3 -.025  .242      .     *     .         3.392  .335 
 4 -.369  .224       . *******|    .         6.116  .191 
 5 -.192  .204       .  ****|    .          7.000  .221 
 6 -.164  .183        .  ***|   .          7.805  .253 
 7 -.193  .158        . ****|   .           9.289  .233 
 8 -.105  .129         . **|  .           9.952  .268 
 
Autocorrelations: NFAY   
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   .  507   .  274       .        |**********.        3.426  .064 
 2  .292  .258      .     |******  .         4.709  .095 
 3 -.171  .242      .   ***|     .         5.211  .157 
 4 -.419  .224       .********|    .         8.730  .068 
 5 -.318  .204       . ******|    .         11.162  .048 
 6 -.324  .183        .******|   .          14.303  .026 
 7 -.020  .158        .   *   .          14.319  .046 
 8 -.047  .129         .  *|  .           14.454  .071 
 
Autocorrelations: DCPY_1: (1-L) DCPY 
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
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  1   .  298   .  284       .         |******  .        1.097  .295 
 2 -.257  .266      .   *****|     .        2.030  .362 
 3 -.233  .246      .  *****|     .         2.924  .403 
 4  .152  .225       .    |***   .         3.384  .496 
 5  .203  .201       .    |****  .          4.402  .493 
 6 -.196  .174        . ****|   .          5.676  .460 
 7 -.300  .142        ******|   .          10.133  .181 
 
10. Germany 
The time series is changed to stationary for all the variables after the second difference is 
taken for DCPY and NFAY, as shown in Table 10. The estimated parameters are: 
 
(1-L)
2 DCPY = 0.287 –0.288(1-L)
2 NFAY– 1.116 DCGY 
t  2.809
* -2.063  -2.846
*
n  7 
R
2 81.9 % 
d  1.831 
 
Using a stepwise method:  
(1-L)
2 DCPY = 0.352 – 1.379 DCGY 
t  2.814
* -2.892
*  
n  7 
R
2 62.6 % 
d  2.536 
 
Table 10 
ACF 
Autocorrelations: DCPY_2: DIFF(DCPY,2) 
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   - . 395   .  309       .   ********  |      .        1.638  .201 
 2  .093  .282      .     |**    .        1.748  .417 
 3  .046  .252      .     |*    .         1.782  .619 
 4 -.157  .218       .   ***|    .         2.303  .680 
 5  .273  .178        .   |***** .          4.648  .460 
 
 
Autocorrelations: DCGY   
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   .  415   .  284       .        |******** .        2.136  .144 
 2  .216  .266      .     |****   .        2.793  .247 
 3 -.074  .246      .    *|     .         2.883  .410 
 4 -.208  .225       .  ****|    .         3.740  .442 
 5 -.248  .201       . *****|    .          5.257  .385 
 6 -.413  .174       *.******|   .          10.875  .092 
 7 -.106  .142        .  **|   .          11.428  .121 
 
 
Autocorrelations: NFAY_2: DIFF(NFAY,2) 
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   - . 593   .  309       ************ |      .        3.697  .055 
 2  .048  .282      .     |*     .        3.726  .155 
 3  .121  .252      .     |**    .         3.956  .266 
 4  .007  .218       .    *    .         3.957  .412 
 5 -.188  .178        . ****|   .          5.071  .407 
 
 
11. Israel 
A linear correlation is found between the residuals of the sum of the squares and DCGY. As 
a solution, I used the following transformed form: DCPY/√DCGY= A1 + A2 (NFAY/√DCGY) + A3 
(√DCGY). The resulting time series was stationary for all variables except for (√DCGY). Taking 88 IBRAHIM L. AWAD 
the first difference of (√DCGY) the time series is changed to stationary for all the variables, as 
shown in Table 11. 
Table 11 
ACF 
Autocorrelations: DCPYW: DCPY/√DCGY 
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   .  262   .  274       .        |*****   .         .915  .339 
 2  .103  .258      .     |**    .         1.075  .584 
 3  .056  .242      .     |*    .         1.128  .770 
 4 -.045  .224       .    *|    .         1.168  .883 
 5 -.083  .204       .   **|    .          1.332  .932 
 6 -.159  .183        .  ***|   .          2.090  .911 
 7 -.182  .158        . ****|   .           3.412  .844 
 8 -.228  .129         *****|  .           6.524  .589 
 
 
 
 
 
Autocorrelations: NFAYW: NFAY/√DCGY 
 
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   .  251   .  274       .        |*****   .         .843  .359 
 2  .070  .258      .     |*    .         .915  .633 
 3 -.014  .242      .     *     .         .919  .821 
 4 -.067  .224       .    *|    .         1.007  .909 
 5 -.079  .204       .   **|    .          1.158  .949 
 6 -.120  .183        .  **|   .          1.589  .953 
 7 -.127  .158        . ***|   .           2.230  .946 
 8 -.197  .129         .****|  .           4.551  .804 
 
Autocorrelations: DCGYW_1: √DCGY 
    
   Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr.  Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25  0  .25 .5  .75  1  Box-Ljung Prob. 
          |————|————|————|————|————|————|————|————| 
  1   - . 027   .  284       .       *  |     .         .009  .925 
 2  .011  .266      .     *     .         .011  .995 
 3 -.072  .246      .    *|     .         .096  .992 
 4 -.092  .225       .   **|    .          .264  .992 
 5 -.014  .201       .    *    .          .269  .998 
 6 -.411  .174       *.******|   .          5.837  .442 
 7  .007  .142        .   *   .           5.839  .559 
 
The estimated parameters are: 
DCPY/√DCGY = 0.892 +3.344(NFAY/√DCGY) +1.11(1-L)(√DCGY) 
t  4.953
* 14.312
* 0.246 
n  9 
R
2 98.6 % 
d  0.879 
Using a stepwise method: 
DCPY/√DCGY = 0.874 +3.302(NFAY/√DCGY)  
t  5.716
* 22.363
*  
n  9 
R
2 98.6 % 
d  0.816 
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